Skip to content

Curriculum Vitae

Areas of Specialization: Ethics, Moral Psychology, Early Chinese Philosophy
Areas of Competence: Metaethics, History of Ethics, Epistemology, Virtue Ethics

Professional Appointments

Harvard University
(Post-doctoral) Harvard College Fellow. 2019 – Present.

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy. University of Oklahoma. 2019.

Dissertation: Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong
Committee: Nancy Snow (Advisor), Amy Olberding, Martin Montminy, Linda Zagzebski, Carolin Showers

Abstract: In my dissertation Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong, I develop a novel constructivist metaethical and normative ethical view by arguing that we should think of ethical theorizing as a design project, akin to architectural, landscape, or user interface design. The upshot of this view for moral philosophy is that we should adjust how we evaluate ethical theories: many considerations for theory evaluation gain or lose weight on this framework. I explore in detail one major implication for this way of doing ethics and argue that it exposes a serious flaw in most familiar normative theories of rightness. Specifically, I argue that, among the considerations that the best designed theories of rightness should capture, there are two that nearly no major ethical view captures simultaneously. The first is a consequentialist consideration, that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be wholly determined by their consequences on welfare because of those consequences. The second is a character consideration, that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be partially but not wholly determined by the particular moral character of the person who committed them.

M.A. in Philosophy. University of Houston. 2013.
B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Juniata College 2007.

Research

Publications

Peer-Reviewed Articles

  1. Forthcoming. Alex Danvers and Seth Robertson. “Good for What? Power, Character, and Moral Judgment.” Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology.
  2. 2019. “Nunchi, Ritual, and Early Confucian Ethics.” Dao: An Journal of Comparative Philosophy. (link)
  3. 2018. “Power, Situation, and Character: A Confucian-Inspired Response to Indirect Situationist Critiques.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (link)
  4. 2017. Heather Demarest, Seth Robertson, Megan Haggard, Madeline Martin-Seaver, and Jewelle Bickel. “Similarity and Enjoyment: Predicting Continuation for Women in Philosophy.” Analysis. (link)

Chapters in Edited Volumes

  1. Forthcoming. Jing Hu and Seth Robertson. “Constructing Morality with Mengzi: Three Lessons on the Metaethics of Moral Progress.” In Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality, ed. Colin Marshall. Routledge.

Special Volume Journal Articles

  1. 2019. “Korean Nunchi and Well-being.” Science, Religion, and Culture. Special Issue: Cross-cultural Studies in Well-being, issue eds. Owen Flanagan and Wenqing Zhao. (link)

Manuscripts Under Review (All available upon request)

  1. “Revenge, Forgiveness, and Exemplarist Moral Theory.”
  2. “Rhetorical Injustice and Epistemic Injustice.”
  3. “What’s Wrong with Unhelpful Comments?”
  4.  “To Cherish What We Ought.”

Awards and Other Distinctions

  1. 2019. Certificate of Teaching Excellence. Harvard Office of Undergraduate Education, Fall 2019 Semester. (Awarded for overall score of 4.5 or higher (out of 5) on teaching evaluations)
  2. 2018. Hugh Benson Graduate Research Prize. University of Oklahoma Philosophy Department. (Awarded annually to one graduate student in Philosophy Department)
  3. 2017-18. Dissertation Research Fellowship. Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing.
  4. 2017-18. Inaugural Appointment to American Philosophical Association Graduate Student Council.
  5. 2017. Ken Merrill Teaching Award. University of Oklahoma Philosophy Department. (Awarded annually to one graduate student in Philosophy Department)
  6. 2016. Selected Participant. American Association of Philosophy Teachers Seminar on Teaching and Learning in Philosophy.
  7. 2014. Selected Participant. Graduate Teaching Academy. University of Oklahoma.

Presentations

APA Presentations

Main Program

  1. 2017. “Revenge and Exemplarist Virtue Theory: Three Arguments Not to Make.” Central Division.

Group Sessions

  1. 2020. “To Cherish What We Ought: A Confucian Ethic of Cherishing.” Eastern Division. Association of Chinese Philosophers in America (ACPA) Panel on “Music, Knowledge, and Virtue: Interpretations and Criticisms of Confucian Philosophy.”
  2. 2018. “How Social Models of Disability Support Mengzi’s Criticisms of Impartial Care.” Central Division. International Society for Chinese Philosophy (ISCP) Panel.
  3. 2017. “Confucianism and the Power Problem for Situationist Ethics.” Pacific Division, International Society for Chinese Philosophy Panel (ISCP) on Chinese Philosophy and Public Life.

 Other Conference Presentations

  1. 2019. “Rhetorical Injustice: A Field Guide.” Bled Philosophical Conference: Social Epistemology and the Politics of Knowing. Bled, Slovenia.
  2. 2018. Jing Hu and Seth Robertson. “Constructing Morality with Mengzi: Three Lessons on Moral Discovery and Meta-ethics.” Lost Voices in Metaethics Conference. University of Washington.
  3. 2018. Jing Hu and Seth Robertson. “Constructing Morality with Mengzi: Three Lessons on Moral Discovery and Meta-ethics.” The Northeast Conference on Chinese Thought / Midwest Conference on Chinese Thought Joint Conference. University of Connecticut.
  • 2017. “Nunchi, Ritual, and Early Confucian Ethics.” Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference. Peking University. Beijing, China.
  • 2017. “Confucianism and the Power Problem for Situationist Ethics.” International Conference on Chinese Philosophy. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
  • 2017. “Nunchi, Ritual, and Early Confucian Ethics.” Harvard East Asia Society Conference. Harvard University.

Pedagogy Presentations

  1. 2021. “Application Papers – 10 Lessons Learned.” American Association of Philosophy Teachers Workshop-Conference.
  2. 2016. “Exercises and Activities to Help Integrate Asian Philosophical Texts into the Classroom.” American Association of Philosophy Teachers International Workshop / Conference.
  3. 2016. Sula You and Seth Robertson. “Classroom Exercises for Helping Students Understand Philosophical Concepts from Asian Traditions.” Eastern Division, Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Panel (SACP) on Practical Steps for Introducing Asian Concepts into Standard Philosophy Courses.

Conference Presentation Comments

  1. 2018. Commentator for Jing Hu “Wang Fuzhi’s Neo-Confucianism on Human-Nature Relationship – An Alternative to Anthropocentrism.” Central Division, APA, International Society on Chinese Philosophy Panel.
  2. 2018. Commentator for Mariam Kazanjian “Reacting to Moral Ignorance.” Eastern Division APA.
  • 2017. Commentator for Charlie Kurth “Anti-Realist Moral Progress and the Problem of Moral Reformers.” Pacific Division, APA.

Curated Blog Posts

  1. 2017. Kelly Epley and Seth Robertson. “Using the Deviant Philosopher This Fall.” Blog of the American Philosophical Association
  2. 2017. “The Deviant Philosopher – A Teaching Resource.” Blog of the American Philosophical Association.
  3. 2016. “A Quick Grasp of Micro-Ethical Situations.” Blog of Duke’s Center for Comparative Philosophy.

Teaching

Primary Instructor

Harvard University
Virtues and Vices. Spring 2020.
Early Chinese Ethics. Spring 2020, Fall 2020.
Human Ethics: A Brief History. Fall 2019, Fall 2020.

University of Oklahoma
Introduction to Ethics. Summer 2018.
Justice in Society. Fall 2015.
Introduction to Asian Philosophy. Spring 2016.
Philosophy Writing Workshop. Fall 2016, Fall 2018.

Rose State College
Introduction to Philosophy. Spring 2017.
Introduction to Philosophy (Oklahoma Department of Corrections). Fall 2018.

Teaching Assistantships

University of Oklahoma
Self and Identity. Instructor: Heather Demarest, Spring 2015.
Introduction to Philosophy. Instructor: Zach Miller, Fall 2014.
Introduction to Asian Philosophy. Instructor: Amy Olberding. Spring 2014.
Introduction to Ethics. Instructor: Brian Chance. Fall 2013.

University of Houston
Introduction to Logic. Instructor: Christy Mag Uidhir. Spring 2013

Service

Conferences Organized

  1. 2015, 2016 University of Oklahoma Graduate Philosophical Association Writing Sample Workshop.

Service – Profession

  1. Communications Representative. Graduate Student Diversity Survey Research Project – collaboration between APA Graduate Student Council and APA Data Task Force. 2018.
  2. Appointee. American Philosophical Association Graduate Student Council 2017-18.
  3. American Philosophical Association Graduate Student Council Liaison to American Philosophical Association Committee on Teaching. 2018.
  4. Co-creator of The Deviant Philosopher Teaching Resource – www.thedeviantphilosopher.org
  5. Referee. Journal of Value Inquiry, Hypatia, Dao.

Service – Department & University

  1. 2017-18. Graduate Student Representative to Faculty. University of Oklahoma Philosophy Department.
  2. 2016-17. President of University of Oklahoma Graduate Philosophical Association.
  3. 2015, 16. University of Oklahoma Graduate Teaching Assistant Orientation. Panelist on Panel of Experienced Teaching Assistants.
  4. 2015 – Present. Organizer, University of Oklahoma Philosophy Department Ethics Reading Group. Topics: Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Disability, Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics
  5. 2015-Present. Co-creator, University of Oklahoma Graduate Philosophical Association Writing Sample Workshop.
  6. 2014-16. Graduate Student Liaison to Faculty Undergraduate Recruitment and Diversity Committee.
  7. 2014-15. Treasurer of University of Oklahoma Graduate Philosophical Association.

Graduate Coursework

University of Oklahoma
Moral Responsibility (Independent Study). Martin Montminy.
Epistemology of Perspectives. Wayne Riggs.
The Analects and the Xunzi. Amy Olberding.
Moral Psychology (in University of Oklahoma Psychology Department). Carolin Showers.
Modal Logic and Metaphysics. James Hawthorne.
Plato. Hugh Benson.
Moral Exemplarism. Linda Zagzebski.
Plato’s Theaetetus. Hugh Benson.
Empiricism. Matt Priselac.
Philosophy of Economics. Steve Ellis.
Early Chinese Philosophy. Amy Olberding.
Epistemology. Matt Priselac.
Metaphysics. Heather Demarest.
Philosophy of Biology. James Hawthorne.
Political Philosophy. Zev Trachtenberg.

University of Houston
Logic III – Advanced Mathematical Logic. James Garson.
Mill, Sidgwick, Moore, & Ross (Independent Study). David Phillips.
Plato and Aristotle’s Theories of Psychology. Cynthia Freeland.
Philosophy of the Special Sciences. Cameron Buckner.
Feminist Philosophy. Cynthia Freeland.
Ethical Theories of Leibniz and Spinoza. Greg Brown.
Metaethics. David Phillips.
Philosophy of Art. Christy Mag Uidhir.
Philosophy of Science. Josh Brown.
Philosophy of Language: Theories of Meaning. James Garson.
Philosophy and Logic. Josh Brown.
17th Century Philosophy. Greg Brown.

Dissertation Summary

        In my dissertation Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong, I defend three connected theses. First, there are no knowable objective (fully mind-independent) moral facts. Second, given the argument for the first thesis, the most plausible metaethical view treats ethics as a project of human design, and not (as many anti-realists have supposed) a project of human invention. Third, given the picture of the ethical project as one of design, most major normative theories of right and wrong have a critical design flaw insofar as they cannot adequately simultaneously capture two key moral considerations. The first is a consequentialist consideration: that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be conclusively determined by their consequences on welfare. The second is a character consideration: that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be partially but not wholly influenced by the moral character of the person who committed them.

        I begin by arguing that there are no knowable objective moral facts. To do so, I modify and expand familiar evolutionary debunking arguments of moral realism, which hold that our evolutionary history influences and shapes our moral-theoretical intuitions in such a way that we should doubt we would ever arrive at objectively true moral facts. I reframe these familiar arguments in terms of epistemic inquiry. I argue instead that at the opening stages of moral inquiry, none of the plausible routes towards epistemic progress are viable. In some cases, this is because evolution has shaped our moral-theoretical intuitions in ways that are incredibly unlikely to track objective moral truth. But, in other cases this is because making epistemic progress would require narrowing the range of possible moral truths in ways unwarranted at the opening of epistemic inquiry.

But, if objective moral facts are not knowable, what does this mean for moral philosophy? Philosophers from Xunzi to Hume and Smith, to Mackie, Joyce, Kitcher, and Street have developed a fascinating line of answers to this question. If we think of morality (in part or in whole) as a technology, an invention with a narrow and particular function, that function can ground and guide our ethical theorizing. Instead, I argue that we should understand morality as a design project (akin to architectural, landscape, user interface, or interior design). A design paradigm differs from an invention paradigm. Cheese graters tend to fulfill quite excellently their narrow function of cutting cheese easily and yet are poorly designed insofar as they also cut fingers easily. The best moral theories are those that are best designed for us: those that best manage and express our sometimes congruent and sometimes conflicting values, goals, needs, desires, abilities, challenges, and limitations. As with any design process, our moral systems are essentially open to revision and thus our established intuitions and commitments about rightness and wrongness are also essentially open to revision. And revision is just what I suggest. Among the considerations that the best designed theories of rightness should capture, there are two that nearly no major ethical view captures simultaneously.

The first is a consequentialist consideration: that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be conclusively determined by their consequences on welfare. A theory of rightness that captures this consideration has several design benefits: it captures intuitions about certain “obvious choice” cases (in which the only difference between two options was a massive difference in the harm done between them), it helps to fulfill one of the most useful functions of the concept of rightness (serving a clear and quick notice that a certain action is especially helpful or harmful), and finally, given empirical evidence that our moral minds are especially tuned to notice harm and to connect it with moral judgments, a theory of rightness should, lacking strong countervailing reasons not to, try to harness and utilize this tendency rather than try to override it.

The second consideration holds that the rightness or wrongness of some (but not all) acts should be partially but not wholly influenced by the moral character of the person who committed them. I argue that a theory of rightness that could capture this condition has several design benefits: it nicely utilizes our natural evaluative tendencies, it nicely captures what we value about certain acts of attachment and virtue and about certain acts influenced by individual differences in moral character, and finally it helps us resist a certain kind of moral absurdity.